Suchergebnisse

The aim here is to do two things: first, to defend a certain definition of terrorism, then explore the moral implications of this definition -- by asking two questions: Terrorist acts are they necessarily reprehensible?; Terrorist acts are they necessarily more reprehensible than other forms of family violence policy? The concept of "terrorism" ... Adapted from the source document.

Il s'agira ici de faire deux choses: d'abord défendre une certaine définition du terrorisme, puis explorer les implications morales de cette définition – en po-sant deux questions: «Les actes terroristes sont-ils nécessairement condam-nables?» et «Les actes terroristes sont-ils nécessairement plus condamnables que d'autres formes proches de violence politique?». Le concept de «terro-risme» doit recevoir la définition suivante: «Usage d'une force extrême poten-tiellement mortelle inspiré par des raisons politiques et accompli contre un ou plusieurs individus sans uniforme militaire par un ou plusieurs individus sans uniforme militaire». Dans cette perspective, on peut définir a contrario l'acte de guerre «légal» (ou conforme au jus in bello) comme suit: «Usage d'une force extrême et potentiellement mortelle inspiré par des raisons poli-tiques et accompli contre un individu en uniforme militaire par un individu en uniforme militaire». Le contraste entre les actes de guerre acceptables et les actes de guerre inacceptables (si l'on admet que le terrorisme est inaccep-table) tient ainsi aux styles vestimentaires respectifs du «tireur» et de sa «cible». Mais les différences de style vestimentaire peuvent-elles rationnelle-ment entraîner des différences morales?

This paper aims at assessing the pacifist claim that the military licence to kill cannot be derived from the right to self-defense. Two clear-cut theories of self-defense, the causal theory and the strong moral theory, fuel two radically opposed conclusions. Indeed, the causal theory supports the classical Just War Doctrine (Walzer),while the strong moral theory supports pacifism. They are two extreme options among a complex set of possible theories of self-defense. I, nonetheless, defend the view that the strong moral theory does remain the most promising one. Whence it follows that, from the point of view of self-defense, pacifism is better established than the classical Just War Doctrine. This Doctrine may only be saved by endorsing rather some form of moral collectivism.

Alors qu'on la croyait morte il y a à peine vingt ans, la gauche radicale forme pourtant aujourd'hui une galaxie vive et bouillonnante. « De l'extrême-gauche classique à l'altermondialisation », comme l'écrit Philippe Raynaud, la scène politique française fourmille aujourd'hui d'acteurs nourrissant « l'ambition de définir une "autre politique" en rupture avec le consensus libéral [.]

This article looks at the individual responsibility of rank-and-file soldiers in "just wars" and defends what might be called "subtle pacifism". Subtle pacifism begins with an acknowledgement of the conflict between the jus in bello imperative of taking part in one's own community's just wars and the pacifist imperative of refraining from any homicidal enterprise. The moral dilemma faced by soldiers in any just war proves insoluble, as may be shown by arguments based on open debate, incommensurable descriptions and the most cogent interpretation of the case of the "naked soldier". The article concludes that to minimize the risk of being trapped in this dilemma, we should work toward an international order that obviates the need for just wars. And to minimize the temptations of bad faith, we should oppose compulsory military service.

I shall offer here a "dilemmatic" argument for liberal antipaternalism. Either it is the case – as Kantians maintain – that impersonal, impartial and universal rules enjoy ethical priority ; or it is the case – as Communitarians like MacIntyre maintain – that universal rules do not enjoy any such priority. If Kantians are right, then – as suggested by the conventional wisdom of textbooks in political philosophy – State-neutrality towards conceptions of the good is justified. And if Communitarians are right, then – surprisingly – State-neutrality is justified too. Therefore State-neutrality is justified. The first premiss is tautological, and needs no special study. The second premiss, linking the priority of universal rules to State-neutrality, is too well known to deserve our attention. But the third premiss, linking the non-priority of universal rules to State-neutrality, sounds like a paradox. The paper thus focuses on that third controversial premiss.

This article looks at the individual responsibility of rank-and-file soldiers in "just wars" & defends what might be called "subtle pacifism." Subtle pacifism begins with an acknowledgement of the conflict between the jus in bello imperative of taking part in one's own community's just wars & the pacifist imperative of refraining from any homicidal enterprise. The moral dilemma faced by soldiers in any just war proves insoluble, as may be shown by arguments based on open debate, incommensurable descriptions & the most cogent interpretation of the case of the "naked soldier." The article concludes that to minimize the risk of being trapped in this dilemma, we should work toward an international order that obviates the need for just wars. And to minimize the temptations of bad faith, we should oppose compulsory military service. Adapted from the source document.